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Abstract—It has been shown that the radio channel impulse
response for a pair of legitimate Ultra-wide band (UWB)
transceivers can be used to generate secret keys for secure
communications. Past proposed secret key generation algorithms
under-exploited the available number of secret key bits from
the radio channel. This paper proposes a new efﬁcient method
for generation of the shared key where the transceivers use
LDPC decoders to resolve the differences in their channel impulse
response measurements caused by measurement noise. To ensure
secret key agreement, a method of public discussion between the
two users is performed using the syndrome from Hamming (7,3)
binary codes. An algorithm is proposed to check the equality of
generated keys for both legitimate users, and ensure error-free
secure communication. The security of this algorithm has been
veriﬁed by AVISPA. Comparisons are performed with previous
work on secret key generation and it has been shown that this
algorithm reliably generates longer secret keys in standard UWB
radio channels.
Index Terms—Ultra Wideband, Secret Key Generation, Reci-
procity, LDPC, Public Discussion, AVISPA.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continual development of faster automatic informa-
tion processing systems has created a need for high data
rate communications systems. Ultra-wideband (UWB) wire-
less communications systems have been proposed for next
generation wireless because of their high data rate capacity
as wells as their robustness, capability for signal transmission
through standard building materials, and simplicity of system
design [1]. However, a disadvantage of existing wireless
communications systems is the danger of the integrity of
the communications being compromised. Wireless systems
send electromagnetic waves through open space that passive
eavesdroppers can intercept. Thus, the security sub-system
in wireless systems has a more important role than in wire-
line systems. A challenge for the designers of UWB wireless
systems is to develop methods for data integrity and security.
Recently, a novel technique has been developed to use direct
UWB channel characterization to generate the secret keys to
provide security in the physical layer of wireless communica-
tions systems [2], [3]. UWB channel measurements are used
to create shared cryptographic secret keys for each given pair
of communicating terminals. The automated generation of a
secret key is intrinsically spatially and temporally speciﬁc,
increasing security. Indoor UWB channels have been found
to be independent for antenna separation distances of more
than 15.2 cm (6 inches) [4]. Therefore, if a reasonable dis-
tance separates the eavesdroppers from each of the legitimate
users, the channel impulse response between legitimate users
becomes a source of shared unique secret information.
Fig. 1 shows the physical scenario of interest in this work.
Users A and B communicate via an UWB channel and gener-
ate a shared secret session key based on the mutual information
of their respective channel characterizations. There has been
a great deal of work in the cryptography community on
secret key generation from noisy observations of a common
random process [2]. In our case, the random process is a radio
channel. The basic idea is that both legitimate users make
measurements of a random process visible to both of them.
Then, the legitimate users must reconcile their observations to
reduce the effect of independent noise [5], and then perform
privacy ampliﬁcation to remove candidate secret key bits
observable by third parties [6]. The key to this method is to
perform this process and obtain the highest number of secret
key bits without leaking information to third parties. Systems
have been previously proposed for the use of UWB channel
measurements for secret key generation [7]. However, it has
been shown that these methods do not come close to obtaining
all the available secret key bits from UWB channel impulse
response measurements [8].
In this paper, a new secret key generation technique is pro-
posed which generates larger numbers of secret key bits from
observations of standard UWB channel models than previously
proposed techniques. The key to this technique is the use
of LDPC decoders to increase the bit agreement probability
between the legitimate users of the channel. Public discussion,
using a Hamming code decoder, allows the legitimate users to
reconcile their independently generated secret keys without
reducing the security of the generated ﬁnal key.
The remainder of this paper has been organized as follows.
Section II provides an overview of the secret key generation
techniques for UWB. The new method of key generation is
also introduced in this section and the beneﬁts of this method
are described. Section III proposed our veriﬁed method for
checking the consistency of generated key in both legitimate
users’ sides. In Section IV, the performance of the proposed
algorithm from simulations is performed. In Section V the
conclusions of this paper are given and some possibilities for
future work described.A B
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Fig. 1. Physical scenario of A and B communicating over the UWB channel
secured through the secret key generated directly from the UWB channel
characteristics [8].
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The basis of the proposed key generation system is the
electromagnetic theory of reciprocity, stating that when one
of two antennas with no non-linear components radiates a
signal, the received signal of the other antenna is independent
of which antenna is the source antenna [9]. In other words,
the radio channel from antenna A to antenna B is equal to
the channel from antenna B to antenna A. Translating the
electromagnetic antenna reciprocity theorem into communica-
tion system theory, the impulse response of the communication
channel from A to B, hAB(t), is equal to the impulse response
channel from B to A, hBA(t). The reciprocity theorem indi-
cates that for two UWB transceivers A and B, the impulse
response of their shared radio channel is a source of shared
information that they can use for generating a secret key to
support secure communications. The only condition is that the
time separation between when A and B measure the channel
must be less than the channel coherence time, Tc,d e ﬁ n e da s
the maximum time duration that the radio channel impulse
response is stable. The assumed indoor environment allows
a coherence time of between 1 micro second and 10 micro
seconds to be reasonable [10]. Also, for the indoor UWB
radio channel, it has been shown that channel realizations are
independent for antennas more than 15.2 cm from either A
or B [4]. Therefore, it is difﬁcult for other radio receivers to
obtain the same channel measurements, and thus obtain A and
B’s secret key.
For secret key generation from mutual observations of a
random process, such as the channel impulse response, it has
been proven in [11] that the secret key rate, S(A;B||E),
available to A and B over an open broadcast channel with
respect to an eavesdropper E is upper bounded by
S(A;B||E) ≤ min[I(YA;YB),I(YA;YB|YE)], (1)
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Fig. 2. Block Diagram of key generation platform
and lower bounded by
S(A;B||E) ≥ max [I(YA;YB) − I(YA;YE), (2)
I(YA;YB) − I(YB;YE)].
where I(YA;YB) is the mutual information between the chan-
nel impulse response measurements with YA, YB,a n dYE
being the channel measurements for A, B and E respectively.
This bound becomes tight when no mutual information
exists between the channel measurements available to the
eavesdropper E and those of A and B. As stated above,
this case is realized when the eavesdropper is sufﬁciently far
away from the legitimate users. Obviously, in such cases, the
theoretic secret key rate is maximized.
A. Key Generation Algorithm
Fig. 2 shows the block diagram of the proposed key genera-
tion algorithm. This paper proposes the use of a LDPC decoder
to reduce the disagreements in the bit sequences of users A
and B caused by the measurement noise. A Hamming(7,3)
decoder is then used to support a required public discussion
between A and B to conﬁrm their independent generation of
the identical secret key in a manner which does not expose
the key to an eavesdropper.
The following algorithm generates the secret key in an eight
step process:
Step 1- Transceiver A sends pulse s(t) to transceiver B
and then transceiver B sends a pulse of the same shape totransceiver A. As was mentioned above, the time separation
between the pulse transmission times must be less than the co-
herence time of the channel, Tc, so both transceivers measure
a signal resulting from the same channel impulse response.
Step 2- So that the measurements are not affected by dif-
ferences in the local clock phase, both transceivers use a
non-coherent envelope detector. Both transceivers detect and
sample the received signals resulting from the transmitted
pulse, s(t), plus independent thermal noise and radio signal
interference. Suppose that the impulse response of the channel
for the time period of interest is h(t), then the received
signal for A and B are yA(t)=s(t) ∗ h(t)+nA(t) and
yB(t)=s(t)∗h(t)+nB(t) respectively where s(t)∗h(t) is the
convolution of signals s(t) and h(t). The noise signals nA(t)
and nB(t) are independent zero mean additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) signals with mean powers of σ2
0 = N0/2.
The random processes, yA(t) and yB(t) are sampled at
higher than their Nyquist rates, generating the discrete time
random processes yA(kT) and yB(kT), respectively.
Step 3 & 4- The next two steps combined models a sigma-
delta analog to digital conversion (ΣΔ-ADC) on the received
noisy channel impulse response waveform. This allows for
high resolution quantized version of the signal to be processed
by the following error removal stages for key reconciliation.
An ideal Σ − Δ-ADC uses a linear predictor on an over-
sampled signal and then performs a single bit quantization
on the resulting prediction error. It has been shown that
this form of quantization can provide excellent quantization
performance [12].
For our system, a Least Mean Square (LMS) predictor with
three taps is used. Investigation on second degree statistics
of the prediction error found that the three tap predictor gave
excellent prediction error performance with little improvement
seen with longer prediction ﬁlters.
We replace the standard hard quantization with a soft
output quantizer based on a LogarithmLikelihood Ratio (LLR)
computation. An LDPC decoder is used in stage 5 to remove
the effects of measurement noise. The use of soft LLR inputs,
as opposed to a hard binary decisions, is standard practice for
LDPC decoders [13]. The deﬁnition of LLR is:
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where ci is the i-th bit of code word, yi is the i-th
noisy symbol, Pr(ci = c|yi) is the probability that ci =
c given the received measurement value yi,a n dQ(x)=
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dt.
Step 5- To resolve the effects of thermal noise in each side,
an error correction coding is required. By using more robust
decoders the potential of removing error bits will be increased.
In this paper, we propose the use of a Low Density Parity
Check (LDPC) error correcting code’s decoder for correcting
discrepancies caused by thermal noise. LDPC codes are among
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Fig. 3. Block Diagram of Mutual Channel Measurements
the most powerful codes known. In this step, the LLR values
from the previous step are blocked into frames of length equal
to the code word length of the LDPC code selected and sent
into the decoder. The LDPC decoder removes discrepancies,
returning a valid code word for the speciﬁed LDPC code.
Some discrepancies will still remain between the two users
sequences. It has been shown that without a public discussion
between A and B, that it is impossible for the two users
to achieve 100 % agreement on a secret key [14]. Thus, it
is proposed in this paper to use a simple public discussion
algorithm based on a Hamming decoder (7,3) to reconcile the
bits.
The measurement model prior to reconciliation is summa-
rized in Fig. 3. Users A and B both observe the channel
impulse, h(t), convolved with the transmitted pulse signal, s(t)
contaminated with independent noise. The resulting signals are
converted to digital signals via a ΣΔ-ADC. The bit sequences
of both users are sent into identical LDPC decoders to reduce
the number of differences between them.
Step 6- In this step, the output bit stream from the LDPC
decoder is grouped into blocks of length 7 and fed into the
decoder of a (7,3) Hamming forward error correction code
to support the public discussion stage of the key generation
algorithm.
Step 7 & 8 (Public Discussion)- Before public discussion,
both transceivers A and B have nearly identical bit sequences
from the LDPC decoders. The purpose of the public discussion
is to allow A and B to discover what portion of bit sequences
they have in common, without revealing what exactly these
common bit sequence values are to an eavesdropper E.
In this paper, the syndrome sequence calculated for a Ham-
ming binary error correction code is transmitted for the public
discussion. It is known that for data signals contaminated
by additive white Gaussian noise, the syndrome sequence
calculated by the decoder for a linear error correction code
is independent of the message bits of the source code word
[15]. In the other words, the syndrome sequence, which is
transmitted over a public channel and is available to eaves-
droppers, does not give any information about the message
bits. Based on this observation, this paper proposes public
discussion based on Hamming (7,3) codes. These codes are
easy to implement and have decoders with low computational
complexity.
In this step, transceiver B sends the syndrome output of its
Hamming decoder to transceiver A. Transceivers A then ﬁndsFig. 4. Block diagram of Key Validation Process
the set of all 7 bit long sequences which would result in the
received syndrome from transceiver B. It then selects the 7 bit
sequences which has the smallest Hamming distance from its
output from stage 6. This process is only a minor variation
from the standard Hamming error correction code decoding
algorithm which is known to have low computational cost. For
example, the bit sequences for each syndrome can be found
in advance and stored in memory [16].
For public discussion, 4 bits are sent over the public channel
to help make a key agreement. While these 4 bits are now
known to any eavesdroppers, the remaining 3 message bits of
the Hamming codeword remain secret. These 3 bits form the
basis of the secret key shared between A and B. Both A and B
iteratively follow this process, storing the agreed upon secret
key bits into local buffers, until the desired secret key length
is achieved.
III. CHECKING KEY CONSISTENCY
At the end of key generation process, the legitimate users
A and B have to make sure that they have generated the same
secret key before they use this key for secure communication.
To perform this check, the following three step algorithm is
proposed. The security of this method in the presence of a
passive eavesdropper has been veriﬁed using the Automated
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications
(AVISPA) software [17].
First- Transceiver B select a random real number R, encrypts
it with its own key KB, and sends the encrypted value on
the public channel, EKB(R), to transceiver A where EK(.) is
encryption operator with key K.
Second- Transceiver A decrypts the received value with their
own key, does a hashing operation on it, encrypts it with KA,
and sends EKA(H(DKA(EKB(R)))) to transceiver B on the
public channel where DK(.) and H(.) are decryption with
Key K and hashing operators, respectively.
Third- Transceiver B decrypts received with KB.I ft h er e s u l t
is H(R) then transceivers sends an ‘OK’ acknowledge to
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being used for public discussion [7].
transceiver A which conﬁrms that both A and B’s keys are the
same. On the other hand, if the result is not equal to H(R) then
transceiver B sends a negative acknowledgement to transceiver
A indicating that the two transceiver’s keys are not the same.
It should be noted that EK(.), DK(.),a n dH(.) are all
assumed public. Also, R cannot be reused and must be
uniquely generated each time even if the a replay attack would
exist against the algorithm.
For our algorithm, the key checking algorithm is run on each
block of the key generated from the algorithm in Section II.
In the next Section, we discuss the probability of transceiver
A and B agreeing to the same key.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this work, our algorithms for key generation and agree-
ment has been simulated with two different decoding methods.
The simulated communication channel model is the UWB
channelmodel CM1 from the IEEE p802.15standard [10]. The
sample time has been set to 0.167 nano-seconds. The detectors
of this system are simple non-coherentenvelope detectors. The0 16 32 48 64 80 96 112 128
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Fig. 7. Comaparison of CDF of key agreement error versus key length for
Channel model CM1 [10] in SNR =5 dB with new and previous methods.
transmitted pulse signal s(t) is a raised cosine signal with a
pulse duration of T =2 0 ps with the energy value of Es =1 .
The LDPC code used to generate the decoder has a code
rate of 1/2, a code length of n = 64800, and a message
length of k = 32400. Fig. 5 shows the cumulative distribution
function for key agreement error versus different key length
and signal-energy-to-noise-power ratio (SNR). [ Here, we do
not have a consistent deﬁnition of SNR with what generally
is used in data communication systems. So that, the signal
is not tranmitted as data but it is to measure the channel
characteristic.] When the SNR is increased, the difference
between the received signal for A and B decreases so the
probability of key disagreement decreases. The key rate in
this simulation is the code rate of LDPC decoding, 1/2, times
the code rate of Hamming decoding, 3/7, is equal 3/14.F r o m
each 14 bits of channel samples, 3 bits can be shared secret
bits for the secret key. To calculate the probability of error
the algorithm has been run 100 times and the number of key
disagreements was recorded.
For comparison, the result of the authors’ previous work [7]
has been shown in Fig. 6. In this algorithm a three bits linear
quantizer had been used instead of LLR computation and
LDPC decoder blocks. In this prior work, a (3,1) repetition
code was used for public discussion instead of the Hamming
(7,3) code proposed in this work. with the above mentioned
codes, the syndrome has two bits length. The key rate of this
algorithm is 1/3.
In Fig. 7 the CDF of agreement error for SNR =5 dB
with new and previous methods has been shown. with the
comparison of the results of the two algorithms, it is obvious
that there is an improvement in key agreement algorithm
with LDPC and hamming (7,3) algorithm. In this method the
probability of error has been decreased 10 times with respect to
the previous algorithm, three bits quantizer and (3,1) repetition
code.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed method for key generation provides an or-
der of magnitude improvement over previously reported key
generation methods. This improvement is the result of LDPC
decoder for reducing the thermal noise effect and Hamming
(7,3) decoder which has been used for public discussion. Also,
with secure protocol which has been proposed for checking
the equality of generated keys in legitimate users’ sides, the
integrity and security of data communication on main channel
will be guaranteed.
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